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ABSTRACT
We examine the relationship between wages and skill requirements in a sample of over
50,000 managers in 39 companies between 1986 and 1992. The data include an unusually good
measure of job requirements and skills that can proxy for human capital.  We find that wage
inequality increased both within and between firms from 1986 and 1992. Higher returns to our
measure of skill accounts for most of the increasing inequality within firms. At the same time, our
measure of skill does not explain much of the cross-sectional variance in average wages between
employers, and changes in returns to skill do not explain any of the time series increase in between-
firm variance over time.  Finally, we find only weak evidence of any declines in the rigidity of
internal wage structures of large employers.
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CHANGES IN MANAGERIAL PAY STRUCTURES 1986-1992 
AND RISING RETURNS TO SKILL  
Earnings inequality has increased considerably in the US economy during the past 20 
years. Economists have examined a number of possible explanations for the change, with 
an emphasis on demand-side changes that increased the returns to skills [Levy and 
Murnane, 1992]. We examine these important explanations for rising inequality by 
analyzing a data set with three unique characteristics. First, the data include a quantitative 
measure of the actual requirements of each job B the skills, responsibility, and 
accountability B that is constructed from a detailed analysis of each job. This measure has 
much higher validity and reliability than most measures of job-relevant skills because it 
captures actual job requirements. Most prior studies rely on proxies for job requirements 
that focus on characteristics of workers, such as years of education, or broad descriptions 
such as job titles. Second, the time series data report on multiple jobs (hundreds and in 
many cases thousands of positions) across 39 companies, allowing us to analyze 
inequality both within employers and between high- and low-wage employers. Finally, 
because these data are for managerial jobs, they allow us to extend the prior research on 
inequality within and between employers which focused on production workers [e.g., 
Davis and Haltiwanger 1991] and to contribute to the growing literature on wage 
structures within enterprises [e.g., Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1994, Lazear 1995]. 
We analyze these data to address a number of questions relating to firm-level wage 
inequality. We begin by describing a number of important features of wage structures at 
large employers. These include the magnitude and persistence of employer-specific wage 
levels, employer-specific returns to our measure of skill, and the sorting of employees 
between employers by skill. We then test explanations about inequality and firm-specific 
wage structures that are based on human capital theory. Among the most important of 
these tests is the extent to which differences in skill requirements explain apparent 
differences in employer wage levels. Our conclusion that differences in job 
characteristics do not explain differences in wage levels is so strong and surprising that 
we replicate the test with a second dataset, where the results were similar. We also 
examine the popular claim in much of the business press that wage structures at large 
employers have become less rigid and more responsive to markets and to individual 
performance in recent years [e.g., Annable, 1997; Burack and Singh, 1995; Chasman and 
Feldman, 1995; Manticade and Pennell, 1992]. In general we find little evidence of 
declining rigidities between 1986 and 1992, although use of bonuses has increased.  
The basic method of this paper is to decompose inequality into two pieces: wage 
inequality between high- and low-wage employers (the employer wage effect), and 
inequality within each employer. The inequality between employers is captured in our 
model by estimating a separate intercept (firm effect) for each employer. We then 
examined each of these forms of inequality in 1986 and changes in them between 1986 
and 1992. Finally, we measure how each form of inequality is related to our precise 
measure of skill and job requirements.   4 
I. Human Capital Theory 
The Appendix presents an illustrative model where wage differences are determined 
solely by differences in skill requirements. In such a world where skill levels also differ 
among firms and good (but imperfect) measures of skills exist, then:  
H1: Differences in employers= mean wages are primarily due to differences in 
mean measured skills. Empirically, the standard deviation of the coefficients on 
the firm effects should be substantially smaller when controlling for skills than 
when not controlling for skills.  
Human capital theory also offers explanations about changes in wage levels and in 
employer wage effects that are based on returns to skill. If firms differ in their initial 
complements of skills and returns to skill have increased over time, then wage inequality 
should increase across firms:  
H2: If returns to skill have increased, then wage inequality between firms will 
also increase at the same pace. (This result assumes that the sorting of skills 
across firms is constant, which is roughly true in this dataset, as noted below.)  
Other researchers have used the corollary of this argument to conclude that rising 
inequality among employers is due to higher returns to skill. For example, Davis and 
Haltiwanger estimate a rising effect of establishment size on wages within manufacturing 
between 1967 and 1983 [1991, pp. 156-7]. They interpret this result as consistent with a 
size-wage effect that results from a relationship between unmeasured skills and size 
coupled with rising returns to skill.  
These arguments also imply that most of this rise in between-firm inequality should be 
eliminated empirically if one can control for skill requirements with an accurate measure 
of skills (as shown in the appendix):  
H3: The apparent increase in inequality between firms should be eliminated or at 
least sharply reduced when controlling for differences in skill levels. Empirically, 
the increase in the standard deviation of the coefficients on the firm effects should 
be much smaller when controlling for skill than when not controlling for skill. 
More complex models of wage determination suggest other reasons why between-firm 
inequality may rise. For example, the standard deviation of firm effects will also rise if 
employers make greater use of company-wide profit sharing and profit levels differ 
across firms. Less obviously, changes in comparisons that compensation professionals 
use to establish pay systems can also increase inequality among employers. Consider, for 
example, the extreme case where employers had set pay in line with a wage survey based 
on other firms= pay levels. If this institutional pay-setting arrangement breaks down, then 
inequality among employers may rise [Levine, 1995]. Perhaps the best example of such a 
change has been the breakdown of pattern bargaining in unionized settings where unions 
set their bargaining demands based on prior settlements of other unions.    5 
Other developments may reduce inequality among employers. If wage levels above the 
market level were largely due to the ability of some employers to pay more (as in 
rentsharing, bargaining, and some fairness theories), then increased competition from 
imports, deregulation, and other product market shifts should reduce wage inequality 
among employers by driving down the Arich@ employers= ability to pay above-market 
wages. This pressure is reinforced if the increase in product market competition is greater 
for companies whose employees have the highest bargaining power and would therefore 
be more able to secure higher wages (Bertrand provides indirect support for this 
proposition [1997].) More generally, compensation practices such as internally consistent 
wage structures (as described in prescriptive compensation textbooks and Levine [1993]) 
will lead to some inequality among employers. If, as the business press claims, these 
institutional forces have eroded, this should reduce inequality among employers.  
 A. Base Pay vs. Total Compensation.  
The analyses described above can be calculated for base pay as well as the sum of base 
pay and annual bonuses, and there are reasons to examine both. Base salary should be the 
aspect of compensation most directly related to skill requirements as employers typically 
describe it as the compensation for meeting the basic requirements of the job. Individual 
bonuses, in contrast, typically reflect performance above and beyond those base 
requirements. Moreover, at some employers bonuses may become an expected part of 
compensation and are paid even when individual performance does not exceed expected 
performance levels, then they should be included as part of the wage paid for stated job 
requirements.  
To the extent that bonuses reflect pay for individual performance, inequality of total pay 
which includes bonuses should be larger than inequality of base pay because it includes 
differences attributable to variations in individual performance. To the extent that 
bonuses also reflect company performance (for example, due to profit sharing), between-
company inequality should be higher with total pay than with base pay. Alternatively, the 
theory of compensating differentials suggests that higher average bonus payments may 
offset lower base pay because employees are ultimately interested in the risk-adjusted 
level of total compensation. If employers differ for some reason in the size of the bonuses 
they pay, then competitive labor markets that work to equalize total compensation would 
suggest that total pay should be more equal across firms than is base pay.  
II. Changes in Internal Labor Markets over Time. 
Our data cover only a relatively short time period, from 1986 to 1992. Nevertheless, this 
short panel permits us to test several claims about how pay structures within large 
employers have evolved. Numerous newspapers and magazines report massive changes 
in Americans= careers during this period. These discussions frequently start with a 
canonical “old” model of an internal labor market, one filled with numerous rigidities. 
For example, in the old model, companies paid similar nominal wages in different local 
labor markets. Large employers also had difficulty implementing meaningful merit pay 
and ended up giving most employees in the same job title about the same pay [see, e.g.,   6 
Foulkes 1980]. The popular press indicates that many of these practices have declined as 
companies have replaced rigid rules with greater responsiveness to the external market, to 
individual performance, and to the employer=s financial and stock market performance. 
The arguments below examine potential changes in wage setting practices associated 
with internal labor market and their empirical implications. 
 A. Have Local Labor Markets Become More Important?  
In many classic internal labor markets, wage policies and structures were common across 
different locations of a company=s operations, paying similar wages to similar job titles 
even across very different labor markets. To the extent that internal company wage 
structures have become less rigid, we should see local labor market conditions such as 
wages and unemployment having a stronger effect on wages. Belman and Levine [1998] 
find that wage levels and structures (e.g., returns to education) at large employers have 
not become more similar to those in nearby small employers from 1979 to 1993, but 
Bertrand [1997] finds that the sensitivity of wages to local unemployment rates has 
increased in companies with increasingly competitive product markets.  
H4A: Wages have become increasingly correlated with average regional wages 
and increasingly negatively correlated with regional unemployment. 
This effect should be more pronounced at jobs that have a closer connection to the local 
labor market. For management jobs like those in our data, first-line supervisory positions 
are more closely linked to the local labor market than are senior executive positions 
which operate more in a national or international labor market. 
H4B: This increase in correlation should be more pronounced for lower-level than 
top-level positions. 
B. Has Pay for Individual Merit Become More Important?  
The practitioner literature on compensation advocates the use of individual-level rewards 
for performance and suggests that its use has increased over time. Merit pay is the term 
used to describe increases in base compensation attributable to individual performance. 
To the extent that merit pay has risen in importance, we expect: 
H5A: Inequality of base pay among employees in the same job title should have 
risen. 
Some employers increase incentives for individual performance not by increasing merit 
pay but by increasing their use of short-term bonus or incentive payments that do not 
enter base pay in future years. If this trend is widespread we expect: 
H5B: Inequality of total pay (that is, base + bonus) within a job title should have 
increased faster than inequality of base pay, and    7 
H5C: Inequality of total pay within a firm should have increased faster than 
inequality of base pay.  
C. Has Rentsharing Become More Important?  
We can also provide imperfect measures of the extent to which companies are tying more 
pay to company-wide performance. These measures are subject to many problems noted 
below; most importantly the dataset contains a limited number of employers.  
First, we can decompose bonuses into a portion that is handed out to individuals and a 
portion that is shared company-wide. In the former, the company identifies good 
performers and gives them bonuses that are proportional to pay, bonuses that act much 
like merit pay except that they do not raise base wages. In the latter, the company 
distributes bonuses equally to individuals across the company. We can regress [bonus / 
(base + bonus)] against control variables plus a set of employer effects where the 
standard deviation of these estimated employer effects measures the extent of company-
wide bonus; the residual measures individual merit bonuses. If company-wide 
gainsharing is increasingly important, we expect: 
H6: The variability of firm-wide bonuses (compared to total pay) has increased. 
Tests of this hypothesis are subject to a number of limitations, however. Any secular 
trend may be obscured by the recession in the early 1990s which should have dampened 
the profits that fund the bonus pool at many employers. Further, this simple 
decomposition cannot distinguish bonuses that are shared by a division or team. Our 
procedure will allocate such bonuses into individual or company-wide portions based on 
the size of the group sharing the bonus. 
A number of arguments have been made about the rising power and influence of 
shareholders in corporate governance in recent decades. Much of the discussion has 
focused on investors= increasing ability to advance management practices designed to 
further their interests such as linking the pay of executives more closely to changes in 
shareholder value [see, e.g., Useem 1996]. We measure company performance directly 
using financial indicators of profits and stock market returns and estimate whether base 
pay and/or bonus became more tightly tied to past corporate performance over the period 
1986 to 1992. (Our method follows Blanchflower, Oswald and Sanfrey [1996]. They 
survey the many difficulties in using correlations between pay and financial performance 
to measure the causal link between performance and pay. Most problematic is reverse 
causality: an accounting identity assures us that the direct effect of a dollar of excess 
wages is to lower profits by $1. Thus, even if higher product-market rents (for example) 
raise wages, the wage, profit correlation may be low or negative.) 
H7: The correlation between recent past financial performance and pay has 
increased over time.  
    8 
  
D. Have Wage Structures Converged?   
Many press stories recount how competition and the reduction of product market rents 
have induced large U.S. firms to move closer to market levels of pay. The effect of this 
development on average compensation might well be obscured in practice by other 
developments such as increased variation in skill levels across employers or increased 
incentive compensation such as profit sharing that varies across employers and affects 
pay levels. The trend toward equalization should nevertheless appear in returns to basic 
units of skill. They should become more common across employers if competitive 
product and labor markets are reducing the ability to pay above or below market rates for 
equivalent units of labor.  
H8: The variation in returns to skill between-firm should decline over time.  
III. Data 
We analyze a proprietary data set collected by Hay Associates, the world=s largest 
compensation consultant. The Hay system begins by identifying the skills that are needed 
to perform particular jobs adequately using detailed and consistent measures of job 
requirements. Job analyses based around detailed questionnaires are developed for each 
functional area such as finance, personnel, or engineering, in order to establish exactly 
what an incumbent does in a job. These include job duties, allocation of time, 
responsibility, critical tasks, customer contact, and many other tasks. The questionnaires 
are completed for each job title, usually by a team of managers, employees holding those 
jobs, and Hay consultants.  
The measure of skill used by Hay measures the autonomy and complexity of jobs which 
are issues central to the theories of wage determination described above. The Hay 
measures are grouped into three categories: “Know How” measures the capabilities, 
knowledge, and techniques needed to do the job ranked according to their complexity. 
The skills captured by this measure include the kind of formal knowledge usually 
associated with years of education. “Problem-Solving” measures how well-defined and 
predictable job tasks are (less defined and predictable tasks make greater demands on 
employees). Finally, “Accountability” measures how much autonomy or individual 
discretion employees have in decision making. The three dimensions are then combined 
into a single index known as AHay points@ that is designed to measure the extent of job 
requirements that workers must perform. Hay=s intention is to make these scores 
comparable across occupations, companies, and over time. 
Hay maintains a data base on what its client companies in different industries pay for 
occupations with a given number of Hay points. Individual clients choose a comparison 
set of employers (e.g., by size, industry, and location) and decide how they would like 
their overall wage structure to be positioned in comparison to those paid by the 
comparison set -- e.g., at the median or at the 75th percentile. Clients also exercise   9 
discretion in deciding how to position the pay of individual jobs in their organization 
compared to that reference set. They may decide to pay some jobs more or less than the 
levels prevailing in the data set, for example, in order to establish wage structures that 
facilitate internally consistent promotion pathways or job ladders consistent with the 
unique set of jobs in their company.  
A. Are the Hay Measures Valid?  
Data from Hay compensation surveys have been analyzed by a number of researchers 
[e.g., Smith and Ehrenberg 1981; Cappelli 1993; and Gibbs and Hendricks 1995]. But it 
is worth considering in some detail the merits and drawbacks of using these data.  
An important goal of the Hay systems is that the measure of skill created by its job 
analysis be consistent both within and across organizations because one of the services 
they are effectively selling is salary comparisons based on skill across firms. Hay asserts 
that “compensation lines are directly comparable from one organization to another” (their 
emphasis [Hay Group, p.8]. Reliability of the measures across jobs and firms is especially 
important for our purposes.  
The process of job analysis (defining the requirements of jobs) and attaching Hay points, 
the measure of skill requirements, to jobs is conducted at an employer by a team of the 
company’s managers that is trained and led by a Hay consultant. The team begins the 
process with a set of “benchmark jobs,” such as nurses, secretaries, or accountants, that 
represent common occupations easily identifiable in the labor market. The skill 
requirements for these benchmark jobs are reasonably constant across employers and are 
largely general as opposed to firm-specific. After the team has completed its analyses of 
the skill requirements of the benchmark jobs, the Hay consultant does another, 
independent evaluation of these jobs. These results are compared to the scores produced 
by the team in order to check for any biases in their work. After attempting to correct 
biases in the team’s judgments and then revising the scores, the consultant does yet 
another comparison, this time with the average scores generated across client companies 
for the same benchmark jobs. A correction factor is generated from that comparison and 
is applied to all of the job analyses generated by the team, for benchmark and non-
benchmark jobs. If, for example, the scores produced by the team for its benchmark jobs 
are 5 percent higher than the average across other companies, then the consultant 
calculates a “correlation factor” that will reduce the scores produced by the team for all 
of the jobs in that company by 5 percent.  
As a final check on the consistency of these skill measures, the company maintains an 
internal Job Measurement Quality Assurance Group to check on the comparability of the 
scores produced across client companies. The consultants in this group are senior 
practitioners known as “correlators” who are certified by Hay in their ability to apply the 
Hay system consistently across client companies. After a consultant and the client team 
complete their analysis of jobs and pay, including any corrections described above, the 
correlators come out to the client company and assess the results for consistency with 
Hay practice elsewhere. And every three years after a compensation system has been   10 
introduced, a Hay consultant returns to the client to evaluation the system and ensure its 
consistency. 
In addition to these internal checks, external pressures also help ensure the reliability of 
the Hay procedures. First, the fact that Hay Associates has been using essentially the 
same job evaluation process for more than fifty years provides opportunities to identify 
and eliminate obvious sources of error. Hay Associates=s success in the market over many 
decades implies that many employers find their job evaluation and weighting scheme to 
be useful. The tens of thousands of dollars that employers spend and the hundreds of 
hours that their managers spend working on job analyses suggests that employers 
consider the services Hay provides as highly valuable. Second, the fact that Hay 
Associates relies on repeat business from large corporations provides important 
incentives to maintain reliable systems: A client would immediately recognize and find it 
disturbing if the Hay job evaluation system generated different skill points in subsequent 
years for jobs that the employer knew had not changed.  
Further, the Hay measures have widespread influence on how jobs are structured and 
evaluated in the economy as a whole and, in that sense, have good external validity. 
During the 1980’s, for example, over 2 million employees were in jobs evaluated by Hay, 
and its system was used by 40 percent of the Fortune 1000 [Labich 1992, pp. 116-117]. 
Moreover, comparisons by non-Hay firms with these establishments extend the influence 
of the Hay system even further. 
In addition to the issue of consistency or reliability, it is also important to consider 
explicitly whether the Hay measures are valid: Specifically, whether they do a better job 
at measuring the dimensions of skill than alternative measures that are available. The Hay 
points= measure of skills and responsibility -- as with any such measure -- is subject to 
several constraints. The process of writing job descriptions and determining which tasks 
and responsibilities should be included in them is somewhat arbitrary, and difficulties in 
matching actual job duties with Hay Associates= compensable factors can also introduce 
errors. How to weight different factors in determining an overall measure of skill is also 
largely arbitrary.  
A potentially important concern is the extent to which clients may have an incentive to 
bias the decisions governing Hay points as a means of shaping pay decisions in one 
direction or another, despite the consistency controls noted above. For example, a 
powerful job incumbent involved in the job analysis process may want to justify his or 
her high current pay, creating reverse causality between Hay points and compensation. 
While such incentives no doubt exist, the clients and the individual employees in them do 
not need to bias the skill measures to shape those wage decisions. The process of 
designing compensation systems gives the client firms ample opportunity to shape wages 
as they wish without altering the measure of Hay points. As noted above, clients choose 
the comparison set for compensation data, they decide where their average compensation 
should be relative to the market, and they make such decisions differently across jobs. 
Because the relationship between pay and points is not mechanical, clients do not need to 
try to bias Hay points up in order to increase compensation for their positions [see Bellak   11 
1984]. (As a further check, in many of the analyses below we control for the level of 
individual jobs in the management hierarchy, a key factor that may influence the ability 
to influence the job analysis -- top executives potentially have more power over the 
process than supervisors. Including these controls rarely altered the results.)  
Finally, it is helpful to contrast the Hay measures and the various procedures they use to 
guard against biases with alternative measures of skills that are typically used in research. 
Job titles and education levels are the most common alternative measures. Both education 
and job title data are typically self-reported and come with all the associated biases -- 
everything from ego-enhancing reporting to simple problems remembering. Education is 
typically measured in years attended (sometimes years completed) with few efforts to 
adjust for the quality or type of education received except in some cases where the type 
of degree completed is included. Job titles often differ across organizations for similar 
positions, especially for managerial jobs. Efforts to generate consistent job titles, such as 
those used by the Census Bureau, confront the same type of matching analysis performed 
by Hay, but with far fewer quality checks than Hay has.  
IV. The Sample 
Our data set examines over 50,000 managerial positions per year in 39 companies in 
1986 and 1992 with the number of managers employed per company ranging between 
129 and 5813. The data captures the population of managerial-level jobs in each company 
and includes the characteristics of the jobs rather than of the incumbents. For each job, 
we can identify its level in the organization chart or hierarchy and the firm to which it 
belongs: CEO or division president; other senior executives with company or division-
wide responsibilities; middle management (that is, managing other managers or 
supervisors); supervisors; and exempt, non-supervisors, generally professional jobs such 
as accountants. We also know the functional area of each job, such as marketing or 
finance, location (zip codes), base salary, total salary, mid-point on the salary scale for 
each job class, and skill points (total, and broken out into the three subscores for know-
how, problem solving, and accountability skills). 
The 39 companies are headquartered throughout the U.S., and the employees in each 
company are often dispersed throughout the country. About 200 of the locations have at 
least 10 managerial employees. We analyze pay data for two years for each company -- 
1986 and 1992. In 1989, the midpoint in that period, the companies ranged in size from 
584 to over 60,000 employees, with a mean of 16,604 and a median of roughly 9,500.  
We first analyze the log of annual base wages because base wages are the component of 
compensation that should be most closely linked to the Hay points measures of skills and 
responsibility. We then present the analyses on total pay, defined as base pay plus annual 
bonuses. We merge into our data set information on total company employment taken 
from Compustat. 
The dataset does not have information on stock options and other forms of long-term 
incentive pay. Moreover, it lacks information on stock ownership, a form of implicit   12 
incentive that can be very important for many top executives [Hall and Leibman, 1997]. 
Thus, our results for the very highest levels of executives may not be representative, 
given that stock ownership is an important part of their total compensation. We replicate 
all results on a sample without top executives, however, creating a sample where stock 
ownership and long-term financial incentives are much less important, to produce results 
that can be generalized to employees for whom base and bonus payments constitute the 
bulk of their compensation.  
V. Methods 
We use an OLS regression to test the model developed above and to examine wage 
inequality across and within firms. We regress the log of base wages against a set of firm 
dummies and a composite indicator of Hay points. To control for unmeasured aspects of 
the jobs, we include each job=s occupational level in the hierarchy (five levels) and 16 
indicators of the functional area within which each job is located -- finance, marketing, 
engineering, and so forth. 
Several analyses examine inequality within a job title. We do not directly observe job 
titles. To identify employees with the same job titles, we match on employer, function, 
level, and Hay points. In 1986, for example, there were 11,641 distinct jobs in the 
sample.  
We used a bootstrap technique to compute the statistical significance of the changes by 
running the regression models 200 times on random halves of each sample and retaining 
the estimated returns to Hay points and/or the estimated standard deviation of the firm 
effects for each regression. To test for differences in a coefficient over time or across 
specifications, we tested whether the distributions of the 200 coefficients in each 
specification differed. We performed a nonparametric Wilcoxon rank test on the two 
distributions of coefficients and/or standard deviations. (Using a more powerful but 
parametric t-test produced the same results.) 
Especially because many of the wage equations involve sample sizes with over 50,000 
observations, even differences that are unimportant substantively can be statistically 
significant. In the discussion below, therefore, we emphasize those results that are large 
and substantive. The large sample size also implies that correcting for measurement error 
when, for example, computing the standard deviation of employer wage effects does not 
meaningfully affect our results [Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt, 1996]. As a result, we 
forego that extra set of computations in the results reported here. 
  
VI. Describing Wage Structures at Large U.S. Employers 
We present summary statistics and checks for representativeness of the sample as well as 
other descriptive decompositions of the data which may be of interest because so little 
few multi-employer datasets are available with measures of both skills and wages.    13 
  
A. Summary Statistics.  
Table I contains summary statistics about the changes in jobs in this sample between 
1986 and 1992. Both base and total wages were higher in real terms in 1992 than in 1986 
with most of the increase in total wages being attributable to the rise in base wages. 
Average skill points were slightly lower in 1992 than in 1986, a potentially interesting 
result given the interest in whether skill requirements in the workforce are rising. The 
differences in wages and in skill points are statistically significant. The standard 
deviation of both base and total wages increased (for example, the standard deviation of 
the log of base wages rose from 31.6 percent in 1986 to 34.3 percent in 1992) while the 
standard deviation of skill points fell slightly during this period. In results not shown, 
other measures of dispersion such as the Theil and Gini coefficients also indicate a 
similar increase in wage inequality. (These measures capture different aspects of the 
distribution than does the standard deviation. Amartya Sen discusses the strengths and 
weaknesses of these measures [1973].) Tables IF and IG present the industry breakdown 
of companies and the distribution of the positions by functional area.  
Table I Here 
  
B. Checks for representativeness.  
An important issue in datasets such as this one is the question of sample self-selection. To 
test whether the firms in this sample were distinctive from employers of similar size in 
their industry, we used Compustat data to match each firm in the Hay dataset to the firm 
closest in 1986 sales within its 2-digit SIC industry. Using a Wilcoxon signed rank tests, 
we found no statistically significant difference between the firms in the Hay dataset and 
the matched firms in the level of sales, employment, or debt to equity ratios in 1992, or 
rate of change in sales, employment, or debt to equity ratios from 1986 to 1992. We also 
found no statistically significant difference in profitability (return on assets) in 1986 or 
1992. Using the acquisitions line on Compustat we found no significant difference 
between the mean size of acquisitions over this time period and no difference in the 
number of acquisitions per year. In short, there is no evidence that these employers are in 
any way non-representative of the population of large industrial firms. (This population, 
of course, is not representative of all employers.) 
 C. Describing Wage Structures:  
The employers in the Hay dataset are relatively homogeneous in terms of size and sector 
(they are all industrial). Because the employers in this data set pay tens of thousands of 
dollars to Hay to find comparable employers and use data from those comparable firms to 
set their own pay levels, we might expect between-employer pay variability to be much 
lower in this dataset than in most others. Nevertheless, the employers appear to have   14 
distinctive approaches to setting their wage structures. For example, wage levels do differ 
across employers for similar jobs. Controlling for 5 job levels and 16 job functions, the 
standard deviation of employer effects was 12 percent in 1986 (Table III, model 1). This 
is somewhat lower than the standard deviation of employer effects estimated in other 
datasets, which range from 14 to 21 percent. (See, for example, the papers in U.S. Bureau 
of the Census, [1998].)  
Employers also pay systematically different amounts for units of skill as measured by 
Hay points. In results available on request, we estimated wage equations which permitted 
each employer to have its own intercept and its own coefficient on Hay points. The 
standard deviation across employers of the return to Hay points was 0.057 in 1986, which 
is a substantial fraction of its mean of .239. Again, the fact that pay structures differ 
among employers accords qualitatively with what other researchers have found (e.g., 
Groshen and Levine [1998]; Leonard and van Audenrode, [1996]). 
 D. Persistence of Wage Structures. Also, as others have found (e.g., Levine [1991]; 
Groshen [1991b], these employer wage effects persist over time. Controlling for level and 
function, the correlation of firm effects in 1986 with those estimated in 1992 is .79. Firm-
specific levels of the Hay measures of skills are almost as persistent. The correlation 
between employer effects in 1986 and 1992 in an equation predicting skills (controlling 
for level and function) is .74.  
Finally, other aspects of the employer wage structures besides the average are correlated 
over time. We permitted each employer to have its own coefficient on Hay points as well 
as its own intercept. The correlation between firm-specific returns to Hay points 
estimated in 1986 and 1992 is .69. This is somewhat higher than the autocorrelation that 
Groshen and Levine [1998] identify with their measure of firm-specific wage structure; 
they estimated 5-year autocorrelations near .45 during that time period. (Their measure is 
for all aspects of the firm-specific wage structure, which may include many transitory and 
person-specific features, while the single Hay measure may capture more about company 
policy.) 
E. Base Pay vs. Base Pay + Bonus.  
As expected, the total inequality of base+bonus is somewhat higher than that of base pay 
alone. In Table IV, the RMSE of an equation with only job level and function controls 
was 25.9 percent for base+bonus, somewhat larger than the 24.7 percent for base pay in 
1986 seen in Table III. We can also conclude that virtually none of the difference in 
inequality between employers appears to be due to bonuses that are shared company-wide 
among managers and professionals. Company-wide sharing of bonuses would lead the 
standard deviation of firm effects to be larger for base+bonus than for base pay alone. But 
in fact, the reverse was true: the standard deviation of firm effects for base pay was 12.0 
percent in 1986 and 11.7. percent for base+bonus.  
Perhaps surprisingly, base+bonus is more closely related to Hay points than base alone. 
When regressing Hay points against base+bonus in 1986 the estimated coefficient was   15 
.220, on base alone the coefficient was only .203. (The regressions included controls for 
level and function.) This result is perhaps not surprising when comparing compensation 
between levels. That is, top executives have on average both more bonus pay and a 
higher proportion bonus pay than their vice presidents. What is somewhat more 
surprising is that the result still holds when we include controls for job level, as in Table 
IV. It would be difficult to imagine that we could have this result if bonus payments were 
largely dependent on individual worker performance as that should vary considerably 
across individuals in jobs with the same Hay points. It would appear, therefore, that 
bonuses have at least as much to do to with one=s position as does base pay. 
 F. Employer Wage Effects by Level.  
It is also interesting to know how consistent wage policies are within a firm. Dickens and 
Katz, for example, present evidence that high-wage industries pay high wages to all 
occupations [1987]. In this data set, the firm-specific intercept estimated for each level 
alone are correlated .89 and above with overall employer wage effect, controlling for job 
function and Hay points. This suggests that these employers pursue consistent policies 
toward wages across different jobs, setting wages for different positions at more or less 
the same point in the distribution of wages for similar jobs across other employers. 
VII. Results 
Table III presents the main analyses. Wage inequality in this sample has increased, as 
indicated in the first row of Table III: the standard deviation of log (wages) has risen 
from 31.6 percent to 34.3 percent, that is, by about 10 percent. (For ease of exposition we 
refer to 100 times logs as “percent.”) Inequality is lower controlling for a job level and 
function (RMSE = 24.7 percent in 1986). The rise in inequality between 1986 and 1992 is 
again almost ten percent. Controlling for job level and function ensures that the increase 
cannot be attributed to any changes in the composition of jobs across that period. (The R
2 
of the regression with just the controls is almost unchanged between 1986 and 1992.) 
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 A. Are Differences in Mean Wages between Firms Primarily Due to Differences in 
Skill?  
The first hypothesis asserted that differences in average wages across employers were 
attributable to differences in average skill levels across employers. Model 1 in Table III 
examines base wages using only firm effects and controls for job level and function, 
without Hay points. The increment to the R
2 due to adding firm effects is 7.9 percent, and 
the standard deviation of firm effects is 12.0 percent, reinforcing the descriptive 
observation earlier that wages differ substantially among employers for employees with 
similar job titles and skills. The second model shows the results of regressing log wages 
against the composite Hay points score. This single measure of skill and responsibility is 
correlated .80 with base wages, corresponding to an R
2 of 64 percent from this single 
measure alone (regression not shown). By way of comparison, a standard wage equation   16 
controlling for age, education, experience, tenure, gender, race, region and various 
nonlinear combinations rarely achieves an R
2 over 30 percent: A wage regression with 
three-digit occupational classifications -- a typical proxy for job requirements and skill in 
other studies -- and the above controls using the 1992 Current Population Survey 
produces an R2 of only 31 percent. The impressive explanatory power of Hay points 
implies that it is a far more complete measure of skill and job requirements than those 
used in the past to explain wage outcomes.  
The third model includes both firm wage effects and the composite Hay points score. The 
standard deviation of the firm effects declines to 11.2 percent when Hay points are 
included, slightly less than its value of 12.0 percent when it is calculated without 
controlling for Hay points. The incremental R
2 of adding Hay points and controls to firm 
effects is 7.8 percentage points, which is almost identical to the incremental R
2 of adding 
firm effects and controls alone, without Hay points ( 7.9 percentage points). The fact that 
the standard deviation of the firm effects and the incremental R
2 of adding firm effects to 
the equation are hardly diminished when controlling for the very detailed measures of 
skill represented by Hay points suggests that relatively little of between-firm inequality is 
due to differences in mean skill levels between firms, providing little evidence in favor of 
hypothesis 1. Another implication of Model 3 is that Hay points are, in fact, being used 
consistently across firms: If they were not, then the adding firm effects should produce 
estimates that are substantially better than using Hay points alone. Yet the improvement 
is relatively modest (last row in Table III).  
These results do not imply that mean wages at an employer and mean Hay points are 
completely uncorrelated. When we regress the mean wage residual at each firm (that is, 
the firm effects from Model 1 in Table III including the controls) and the mean Hay 
points residual at each firm (that is, the firm effects from model 2 in Table III including 
the controls), the R
2 is .12 in 1986 (regression not shown). This R
2 is only one-fifth as 
large as that obtained when we perform the regression at the individual level. Together, 
these results suggest that skill as measured by Hay points is a powerful predictor of 
wages within enterprises but a weak predictor of which employers pay high wages.  
The inability of detailed skill measures to reduce the variances of employer wage effects 
was surprising but not entirely without precedent. Similar results were found in 1982-83 
surveys that compared manufacturing establishments in the Indianapolis area in the U.S. 
to those in the Kanagawa prefecture in Japan (an industrial district outside of Tokyo). 
These surveys provided one of the few datasets in addition to our Hay data that contain 
both detailed measures of job characteristics and sufficient observations per employer to 
estimate employer wage effects. (James Lincoln and Arne Kalleberg [1990] discuss the 
data in detail.)  
In addition to standard measures such as age, race, education, tenure, and experience, the 
surveys included questions on 12 (in Japan) or 13 (in the U.S.) job characteristics such as 
training, autonomy, complexity, and supervision that offered proxies for job and skill 
requirements. The job characteristics were important predictors of wages. In both 
countries, increasing each measure of OJT and complexity and lowering each measure of   17 
supervision by one point each (on a four point scale) has about the same effect as raising 
education by four years. (Complete results are in Levine [1991], tables 2 and 3.)  
As with other datasets, employers paid very different wages to employees in the same 
broad occupation with similar demographic characteristics and human capital. The 
standard deviation of employer wage effects was 18.5 percent in the U.S. and 13.7 
percent in Japan. These employer effects are very large; in both countries, moving from 
the average plant to one paying one standard deviation above average increases wages by 
as much as increasing education from grade school to college. 
In spite of their importance in predicting wages, however, the adding the many job 
characteristics to the wage equation with standard controls plus plant effects did not 
reduce the dispersion of establishment wages. Specifically, the standard deviation of 
plant wage effects in the U.S. actually rose slightly from 18.5 percent in the baseline 
equation to 19.0 percent when job characteristics are added to the regression while the 
Japanese figure declined only slightly from 13.7 percent to 13.5 percent. The plant effects 
with and without job characteristics were correlated at or above the 0.98 level in both 
countries.  
These results are hardly definitive, but replication of this key and surprising result in the 
Indiana and Japanese datasets as well as the very different Hay data set raises our 
confidence that measures of skill and job characteristics do not, in fact, explain much of 
the differences in wages among employers.  
B. Changes over Time . 
Firm wage effects have grown over time in the Hay sample. The standard deviation of the 
firm effects alone (model 1) grew from 12.0 percent in 1986 to 14.6 percent in 1992, and 
the incremental R
2 of adding firm effects given the controls increased from 7.9 to 9.0 
percentage points. These results support H:2, that wage inequality between employers has 
risen. Davis and Haltiwanger [1991] and Groshen and Levine [1998] also find rising 
inequality between employers during this time period. And the rise in inequality was not 
due to increased sorting of skills among employers. 
The rise in inequality was greater between employers than within employers. Within-firm 
inequality of log wages (measured by the root mean square error [RMSE] of an equation 
including controls and firm effects) rose from 23.1 to 24.7 percentage points between 
1986 and 1992, about 9 percent. In contrast, inequality between employers (the standard 
deviation of the firm effects) rose from 12.0 to 14.6 percentage points over the same 
period, a 21 percent increase that is about twice as fast as the growth of overall inequality 
(Table III, model 1). This result contradicts hypothesis 2, which notes that if inequality 
within and between firms are both proxies for human capital, then their returns should 
grow in tandem.  
Within-firm inequality might have increased more rapidly between managers and lower-
level employees, however. For example, Davis and Haltiwanger [1991] calculate that   18 
wage inequality between manufacturing plants measured in an establishment survey (the 
LEED) grew more slowly than total wage inequality measured in a household survey (the 
CPS). Assuming the two sets of inequality measures are comparable, they then estimate 
that 25-40 PERCENT of the increase in wage inequality is within plants for 
nonproduction workers. 
 C. Do Higher Returns to Skill Explain Most of the Rise in Wage Inequality?  
Model 2 in Table III regresses the composite measure of Hay points and job-level 
controls against wages in order to test H:3, that the increase in inequality between firms 
can be accounted for by changes in returns to skill. Consistent with the assumption that 
returns to human capital have risen over this period, the coefficient on Hay points rises 
about 15 percent (from 20.3 to 23.3) between 1986 and 1992.  
Rising returns to this measure of skill explains only a portion of the rise in inequality 
between firms, however. The incremental R
2 from including Hay points (given the 
controls) rises from 31.4 to 32.7 percent from 1986 to 1992 while the RMSE of the 
regression rises from 17.3 to 18.2 percent. (In regressions not shown, without the 
presence of the controls, the R
2 of the equation including only Hay points actually 
declines slightly, from .64 in 1986 to .60 in 1992.) These increases in the inequality 
explained by Hay points are not significant, however, based on the bootstrap test. In 
model 3 we add firm effects and Hay points to a model with the standard job controls. 
The standard deviation of the firm effects in fact rises 2.7 percentage points, about 20%, 
suggesting that rising inequality between employers cannot be due to rising returns to the 
skills measured by Hay points and refuting H:3.  
 D. Robustness Checks.  
Robustness checks (available from the first author) found the results essentially 
unchanged when we analyzed base pay plus bonus instead of base pay alone (Table IV); 
omitted the detailed controls for functions and levels within the organization; replaced 
average Hay points with the know-how, accountability, and problem solving subscores of 
Hay points along with their squares; included those employers who dropped from the 
sample in 1992 to perform the cross-section tests on a larger sample; added measures for 
SMSA mean wages and unemployment rates; corrected roughly for heteroskedasticity by 
weighting by 1/Hay points; ran the regression separately for each job level and for the 
larger job functions; and dropped the 1% of the sample with the highest and lowest Hay 
points and wages. 
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VIII. Changes in Internal Labor Markets over Time 
While the previous section tested results of a deductive model, this section provides 
evidence for hypotheses derived from more descriptive and inductive theories about the 
decline of internal labor markets.   19 
  
A. Changes in Correlations with Local Labor Market Conditions.  
If the compensation structures of firms over time resemble internal labor markets less and 
their wage setting mechanisms are more closely tied to external labor market forces, we 
should expect to see a stronger relationship between wages and local market 
characteristics over time. We test this notion by examining the differential paid to 
incumbents in similar jobs (same job class and skill points) across locations within the 
same firm in the two time periods. First we examine the variance in wages across 
locations. In 1986 the mean standard deviation of base salary for similar work at different 
locations was $3,302. This declined slightly to $3,230 in 1992 (change not statistically 
significant), suggesting that the geography differential has remained relatively stable over 
this time period.  
We then calculated the percentage difference between the mean wage for each job at each 
company location and the overall mean wage for that job across the company and 
regressed it on local market wages and unemployment. In contrast to hypothesis 4A, local 
labor market conditions were not significant predictors of wage differentials in either 
1986 or 1992. Hypothesis 4B suggests that while the overall relationship should have 
increased, that rise should have become most pronounced for professionals and first-line 
supervisors, as opposed to top managers. In fact, results were not significant for these 
groups, either, although the number of limitations to our analysis suggests that the lack of 
significant results can only be considered suggestive. 
Table V here 
 B. Has Merit Pay Become More Important?  
To the extent that individual-level rewards for performance have become more important, 
we should see an increase in inequality for base pay for employees in the same job title 
has risen as H:5A predicts. Consistent with that hypothesis, the typical (median) standard 
deviation in total cash compensation within job titles for jobs with four or more 
incumbents had a standard deviation of total pay of 7.0 percent in 1986 and 7.5 percent in 
1992. All job levels experienced an increase in the standard deviation of total 
compensation, but it was larger for first-line supervisors (7.3 to 8.0 percent) and smaller 
for professionals (6.9 to 7.0 percent). The rise in inequality within a job title averaged 
about 8.0 percent, slightly less than the 11 percent rise in total inequality in base wages in 
this sample. This increase in pay inequality within jobs is consistent with the concept of 
Abroad banding@ in the practice of compensation whereby the upper and lower bounds of 
acceptable pay levels for any given job title are widened presumably to give more 
opportunity to differentiate pay according to individual performance. (Groshen and 
Levine [1998] also find a small but statistically significant increase in pay variation 
within a job title during the 1980s and 1990s.)   20 
A second aspect of the rising importance of individualized incentives is the increased use 
of bonuses. Thirty-two percent of employees in our sample received a positive bonus in 
1992, up from 19.6 percent in 1986, a calculation that no doubt understates the extent of 
bonuses because not all who were eligible for bonuses necessarily received payment. If 
we instead estimate the percentage of job titles (that is, positions sharing job level, job 
function, and Hay points) where bonuses were received, the percentage rises from 27 to 
47 percent over the same period. In 1986, bonus variation within job titles was on 
average a small part of total pay. Considering jobs with four or more incumbents in the 
same firm (eliminating by definition all top executives), we calculated the variation in the 
percentage of bonus within job title: specifically, the standard deviation of 
bonus/(base+bonus) for employees with the same employer, job level, function, and Hay 
points. Over the entire sample, the mean standard deviations of this measure within a job 
cell was 0.75 percent in 1986. That is, bonuses increased pay variation only modestly 
among people in the same job title.  
At the same time, we find some evidence for hypotheses 5B and 5C that inequality rose 
faster for bonus than for base pay within job titles and within firms. These hypotheses are 
based on arguments popular in the compensation literature that employers make greater 
use of bonuses to reward individual performance than in the past. The proportion of pay 
at risk in our data set as measured by the size of the bonus payments rose from .75 
percent in 1986 to 1.03 percent in 1992. While the absolute level of these payments is 
low, the increase in level is particularly impressive given that 1992 was a year of low 
corporate profits. Assuming that bonus pools are related to corporate performance, the 
1992 figures are an understatement of the true rise in the importance of bonuses.  
 C. Have Rentsharing / Company-wide Incentives Become More Important?  
If bonuses have risen in importance, because of rent sharing or other motives, then we 
should expect that any increase in the standard deviation of firm effects would be larger 
for base+bonus than for base pay alone (Hypothesis 6). There is modest support for this 
hypothesis. The standard deviation of firm effects for base pay increased by 2.6 
percentage points (Table III, model 1) but by 3.0 percentage points for base+bonus 
(Table IV, model 1). But business cycle effects that influence the level of profits of all 
firms, causing profits and bonuses to decline in 1992, e.g., confound this comparison. 
The increase in the standard deviation for base+bonus might be much greater in a more 
typical year.  
If rent sharing with employees through incentive-based pay linked to company 
performance has increased, then we would expect to see a higher correlation between past 
financial performance and current pay in 1992 than in 1986 (Hypothesis 7). In our 
sample, employer wage levels are not correlated with past financial performance. We 
estimated the relationship using several measures of “financial performance,” including a 
one-year lag of return on invested capital, a three-year average of lagged ROIC, and 
market-to-book ratio. None had a significant correlation with wage effects either in 1986 
or in 1992 (Table VI).    21 
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D. Have Pay Structures Converged?  
Finally, if market forces have reduced an employers= ability to execute distinctive 
approaches to compensation, then the returns to Hay points should have become more 
similar over time (Hypothesis 8). The data do not support this hypothesis. The estimated 
standard deviation across employers of the return to Hay points was 0.057 in 1986 and 
0.066 in 1992. The average coefficients were .239 in 1986 and .257 in 1992, so the 
coefficient of variation of the firms-specific returns to Hay points rose about 8 percent 
over this time period.  
VIII. Discussion 
Some of the results presented here are consistent with traditional human capital theory 
where higher skill requirements lead to higher wages. Most importantly, our single 
measure of skills and responsibility explains 64 percent of wage variation in the base year 
of the sample. It is interesting to see that even for management jobs, the elaborate 
compensation structures of large corporations are based in large measure on human 
capital requirements as illustrated by the fact that the correlation between wages and Hay 
points is even higher within firms than between them. 
We find that wage inequality has risen quite substantially between 1986 and 1992. Even 
in this short span, inequality of log(wages) rose by about 9 percent. Inequality between 
firms rose faster than within firms, by 20 percent versus 8 percent. Almost all of the 
increase in inequality within firms in our data can be attributed to rising returns to Hay 
points. Numerous authors have found that some of the rise in inequality is due to higher 
returns to education, but a substantial portion of the increased inequality typically 
remains unexplained. Our better measure of skill and job requirements accounts for more 
of the rise of inequality than have other studies, consistent with the claim that omitted 
human capital explains the rise in inequality among people at the same employer with 
similar observable skills.  
With respect to inequality across firms, we found first that companies pay workers in 
similar jobs quite different wages, as have previous studies. Human capital theory does 
poorly in explaining between-firm differences in wages. In 1986, for example, the 
standard deviation of firm effects was almost the same with and without controlling for 
Hay points. That is, very little of the differences in mean wages between high- and low-
wage firms was due to differences in mean levels of skills and responsibility. This result 
is both strong and surprising and is replicated in similar data with information on 
employees, job characteristics, and employers in Indiana and Japan.  
A possible explanation for the lack of effect of Hay points in explaining between-plant 
inequality is that high-wage employers may pay more in order to attract and retain more 
qualified employees than the jobs require. That is, while Hay points measure the 
requirements of jobs, some employers may systematically hire “over-qualified”   22 
employees to ensure above average performance. Although this hypothesis cannot be 
examined with this dataset, it is worth noting that in other research, traditional measures 
of human capital such as tenure and education have little incremental ability to predict 
wages after controlling for firm and occupation-specific factors, as we have done in this 
study. More generally, these results echo past studies where individual-level job 
characteristics that might proxy human capital have had limited success in “knocking 
out” what appear to be wage anomalies (e.g., Krueger and Summers [1988] on industry 
wage effects; Groshen [1991b] on establishment wage effects; and Brown and Medoff 
[1989] and Kruse [1992] on size-wage effects). 
While rising returns to Hay points account for out most of the rise in within-firm 
inequality, Hay points explain none of the rise in inequality between firms. Davis and 
Haltiwanger [1991] infer that the increases over time in inequality for production wages 
they observe between manufacturing plants, coupled with other evidence of increasing 
returns to measurable skills such as education, “are consistent with explanations for the 
gap that stress sorting by worker ability.” They assert that the rise in inequality suggests 
that Athe sorting by worker ability across plants of different size probably increased over 
time.” Our direct test of increased sorting does not support their conclusion, at least with 
our sample of managerial employees. We find no consistent pattern of increased sorting 
of skills between employers.  
Proponents of human capital theory may not be swayed by the lack of evidence in our 
analyses that skills are behind the rise in inequality between firms. Despite the fact that 
our skill measure is correlated at .80 with wages, it is possible, for example, that some 
aspect of skill that Hay does not measure may be increasing in importance over time and 
may not be evenly distributed across firms. Nevertheless, these results should give pause 
to researchers who are confident that differences in mean levels or increases in the 
differences in mean pay between employers are due to unmeasured skills. 
Our results suggest mixed evidence that the administrated wage structures that 
characterize classic internal labor markets are giving way to arrangements where the 
labor market has a greater role. We find no evidence that local labor markets have much 
effect on the wages of these large employers, even for professional and first-line 
supervisory jobs which are closer to the outside labor market, either in 1986 or 1992. We 
do observe a small increases in pay variation within job titles, however, that would be 
consistent with the hypothesis that merit pay has become more important as well as large 
increases in the use of bonuses. We also find that the dispersion of employer-specific 
returns to Hay points rose slightly over this period, contradicting the hypothesis that 
competitive pressures are equalizing wages across otherwise similar jobs.  
In considering these results, it is important to recall the limitations of the dataset B most 
notably, its modest number of employers and limited span of years. The sample is also 
fairly homogeneous in that the employers are large and relatively old. Importantly, 
because the employees are restricted to managers and professionals; inequality between 
these occupations and hourly employees cannot be examined. The sample studied by 
Davis and Haltiwanger [1991] examines a broader range of firm sizes and employee   23 
occupations, workers, and some of the changes they observe may not be visible in the 
smaller slice of firms and employees in this sample. More recent data might also reveal 
greater changes in internal labor markets given that other studies are finding changes only 
in the mid-1990s (e.g., Neumark, Polsy, and Hansen [1998]).  
Finally, these results raise new questions for future research. Perhaps the most obvious 
question is why do skills provide a reasonably good explanation for rising wage 
inequality within firms but not for the increase in inequality across firms? Perhaps 
individual employers are able to adjust wages to skill requirements inside their operations 
but firm-level wage strategies, such as efficiency wages, still differ across firms and 
override the tendency for wages to equalize for jobs with similar skill requirements. 
Although few datasets will have better measures of skills and responsibility, future 
research will want to examine larger samples of both employees and employers coupled 
with more characteristics of each in order to address questions like these.   24 
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Table IB: Hay Skill Points 
   
Mgt. Level 
















   
M=0 
   
39 
   
39 
   
1352 
   
838 
























   
4762 
   
4102 
   
363 
   
127 




   
2.36* 
   
M=3 
   
22695 
   
19297 












   
26088 
   
31308 
   
171 






   
7.17** 
   
All 
   
54080 
   
55225 
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Table IC: Base Pay 
   
  
   
1986 
Mean S.D. 




Difference of Means 
T-Stat 
   
M=0 
   
220000 
   
141982 
   
231150 
   
158205 
   
2.09* 
   
M=1 
   
119682 
   
58175 
   
116369 
   
55062 




   
62722 
   
18026 
   
67884 
   
22493 
   
11.49*** 
   
M=3 
   
41610 
   
10422 
   
44531 




   
M=4 
   
35970 
   
9379 
   
38039 
   
11105 
   
23.34*** 
   
All 
   
41607 
   
17649 
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Table ID: Total Compensation (Base Pay + Bonus) 





   
1986 
Mean S.D. 







   
M=0 
   
268235 
   
194394 
   
310526 
   
256258 
   
2.17* 
   
M=1 
   
141669 
   
81657 
   
141498 
   
85027 




   
67242 
   
23450 




   
12.3*** 
   
M=3 
   
42315 
   
11424 
   
46107 
   
14875 
   
28.2*** 




   
9720 
   
38969 
   
11418 
   
26.72*** 
   
All 








   
17.1*** 
 Notes: All figures expressed in 1986 dollars. 
 M = 0 is CEO or Division president, 1 is other senior executives with company or 
division-wide responsibilities, 2 is division managers (managing other managers or 
supervisors), 3 is supervisor, and 4 is exempt, non-supervisory positions, generally 
professional jobs.    33 
Table IE: Industry breakdown of respondents 
  SIC   DESCRIPTION   N   SIC   DESCRIPTION   N 
 20   Food and Kindred Products   4   35   Industrial & Commercial 
Machinery & Computer 
Equipment  
 4 
 26   Paper and Allied Products   3   36   Electronic & Other Electric   3 
 27   Printing, Publishing & Allied 
Inds 
 1   37   Transportation Equipment   1 
 28   Chemicals & Allied Inds   2   38   Measuring, Analysis & 
Controlling Inst 
1 
29  Petroleum Refining & Related 
Inds 
3  40   Railroad Transport  2 
 30   Rubber & Misc Plastics  1   49   Electric, Gas & Sanitary 
Services 
6 
 32   Stone, Clay, Glass etc.  2  50   Durable Goods Trade  2 
33  Primary Metals   2   51   Non-durable Goods Trade    1 
34   Fabricated Metal Products   1          
    34 
Table IF: Functional breakdown of respondents 
  





Mean Skill Points  
  
Mean Base Salary 
    1986   1992   1986   1992   1986   1992 
 General 
Mgmt/Multifield 
 630   415   690.638   661.665   105370.5   112063.2 
 Strategic/Corporate 
Planning 
 128   104   339.945   313.75  61921.54  65260.56 
 Finance/Acctg   3768   3954   211.476   207.482   41023.2   44167.9 
 Info Sys/ DP   3259   4995   190.122  185.256   38803.74   39827.39 
 HR   2185   2331   208.05   203.616   41523.28   44421.57 
 Legal   504   426   305.821   303.857   55680.49   60438.94 
 Marketing   8604   9638   214.176   204.039   39585.22   39808.25 
 Public Relations   286   327   234.804   222.419   47261.31   48819.96 
 Facility Services   1409   1554   177.51   155.693   38711.61   37431.81 
 R&D   1756  1878   236.203   231.952   44202.21   50116.17 
 Engineering   7691   8125   203.966   195.092   42156.84   45317.06 
 Materials Mgmt   1979  2175   177.155   175.845   36024.76   38458.5 
 Purchasing/Contracting   906  938   207.422   192.788   41049.23   42737.76 
 Plant Engr  2015   1814   198.984   196.135   42775.41   46094.92 
 Mfg or Prod Engr   1314   1445   200.524   198.531   39373.31   44038.31 
 Quality Assurance   964   1000   194.01   191.762   39269.54   42441.18 
 Prod/Mfg Operations   6222   4644   184.834   191.496   38986.15   42989.94 
Rail Transport 
Operations 
 2942   2197   181.673   181.675   44526.31   39645.18 
 Power Generation   854   525   193.987   195.796   45438.89   47716.31 
 Power Transmission   630   555   179.438   180.975   42661.45   43458.86 
 Gas Transmission   200   152   172.25   172.316   45670.52   47869.42 
 Utility Customer Service   503   495   159.823   153.556   36356.89   36533.89 
 All Others   5331   5538   203.934   224.96   40479.98   42957.59 
    54080   55225                 
    35 
  
Table II: Are Skills Increasingly Sorted between Firms? 
Dependent variable is log(Hay points) 
RMSE = Root means square error 
    1986   1992   Change 
(1992-1986) 
 s.d.(log(Hay points))   0.398   0.394   -.004 
 Model 1: Only firm 
effects.  
  




2 = .053 
 s.d.(firm effects) = 
.121 
RMSE = .384 
R




 Model 2: Firm effects 
and controls for job level 
and function. 
 s.d.(firm effects) = 
.137 
RMSE = 0.288 
R
2 = .477  
 s.d.(firm effects) = 
.127 
RMSE = 0.302 
R
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Table III: Predicting Base Wages 
Dependent variable is log(base wage) 
RMSE = Root means square error, a measure of within-firm inequality 




 Total wage inequality   s.d(log wage) = 0.316   s.d(log wage) = 0.343   .033 
 Controls Alone: Job 
Level and Job Function 
 RMSE= .247 
R
2 = .386 
 RMSE= .268 
R
2 = .391 
 .021  
.005 
 Model 1: Only firm 
effects & controls.  




2 = .467 
 s.d.(firm effects) = 
.146  
RMSE = .247 
R
2 = .481 
 .026 **  
.016  
.014 
 Effect of Adding Firm 
Effects (Model 1 - 
Controls Alone) 
 ∆RMSE = -.016 
∆R
2 = .079  
 ∆RMSE = -.021  
∆R
2 = .090 
 -.005 
.011 
 Model 2: Only Hay 
points & controls 
 b = .203 (SE = .0008) 
** 
RMSE = 0.173 
R
2 = . 700 
 b = .233 (SE = .0009) 
** 
RMSE = 0.182 
R
2 = .718 
 .030 ** 
.009  
.018  
 Effect of Adding Hay 
points (Model 2 - 
Controls Alone) 
 ∆RMSE = -.058 
∆R
2 = .314  
 ∆RMSE = -.065 
∆R
2 = .327  
 -.007 
.013  
Model 3: Firm effects, 
Hay points, and controls 
 s.d.(firm effects) = 
.112 ** 
 s.d.(firm effects) = 
.139 ** 
 .027 **   37 
b = .211 (SE = 
.0007)** 
RMSE = .149  
R
2 = .778 
b = .239 (SE = .0008)** 
RMSE = .152 
R




 Effect of Adding Hay 
points, given Firm 
Effects, (Model 3 - 
Model 1) 
 ∆s.d.(FE) = -.008 ** 
∆RMSE = -.082  
∆R
2 = .311 
 ∆s.d.(FE) = -.007 ** 
∆RMSE = -.095 
∆R
2 = .323 
 -.001 (n.s.) 
.013 
.012 
 Effect of Adding Firm 
Effects, given Hay 
points (Model 3 - Model 
2) 
 ∆b = .008 ** 
∆RMSE = -.024 
∆R
2 = .078  
 ∆b = .006 ** 
∆RMSE = -.030 
∆R
2 = .086  




Note: All tests are noted as ** or (n.s.). ** implies the change is significant at the 1% 
level. (n.s.) implies not statistically significant at the 5% level. Tests of the statistical 
significance of coefficient estimates (b) and changes in coefficients (∆b) are t tests. Tests 
of the joint statistical significance of firm effects are F tests. Tests of changes over time 
(the final column) are bootstrapped, as described in the text.   38 
 
Table IV: Predicting Base Pay + Bonus 
Dependent variable is log(Base Pay + Bonus) 
RMSE = Root means square error, a measure of within-firm inequality 
    1986   1992   *Change 
(1992-1986) 
 Total wage inequality   s.d(log base+bonus) = 
0.333 
s.d(log base+bonus) = 
0.363 
 .033 
 Controls Alone: Job 
Level and Job Function 
 RMSE= .259  
R
2 =.369  
 RMSE= .284  
R
2 = .386  
.025 
.017 
Model 1: Only firm 
effects & controls.  
 s.d.(firm effects) = 
.117 
RMSE= .243  
R
2 =.469  
 s.d.(firm effects) = 
.148  
RMSE = .265  
R




 Effect of Adding Firm 
Effects (Model 1 - 
Controls Alone) 
 ∆RMSE = -.016 
∆R
2 = .079 
∆RMSE = -.021 
∆R
2 = .090 
 -.005 
.011 
Model 2: Only Hay 
points & controls 
 b = .220 (.0008) 
RMSE =.175  
R
2 = .724  
 b = .255 (.0009)  
RMSE = .185 
R
2 = .735; 
 .025  
.010  
.011 
 Effect of Adding Hay 
points (Model 2 - 
Controls Alone) 
 ∆RMSE = -.058 
∆R
2 = .314 
∆RMSE = -.065 
∆R
2 = .327 
-.007 
.013 
 Model 3: Firm effects, 
Hay points and controls 
 s.d.(firm effects) = 
.108 
b = .227 (SE = .0007) 
 s.d.(firm effects) = 
.140 
b = .261 (SE=.0008) 
.022 
.034 
.007   39 
RMSE =.152 
R
2 = .793 
RMSE = .159 
R
2 =.808; .804 
.015 
 Effect of Adding Hay 
points, given Firm 
Effects, (Model 3 - 
Model 1) 
 ∆s.d.(FE) = -.008 
∆RMSE = -.082  
∆R
2 = .311 
∆s.d.(FE) = -.008  
∆RMSE = -.095 
∆R




 Effect of Adding Firm 
Effects, given Hay 
points (Model 3 - Model 
2) 
 ∆b = .008 
∆RMSE = -.024 
∆R
2 = .078 
 ∆b = .006 
∆RMSE = -.030 
∆R





Table V: Effects of Local Labor Market Conditions on Wages 
Dependent variable is mean wage per job for each 
location/mean wage per job across company 
    Entire sample    Professionals and first-line 
supervisors, as opposed to top  
  
  












 Local wages   .111 
(0.114) 
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Table VI: Above-Market Wages and Corporate Performance 
Dependent variable is the estimated employer wage effect from Table 3, model 1. 
  Independent 
variables  
 1986  1992 
   Coefficient 
(SE) 
 R2   Coefficient 
(SE) 
 R2 
 One-year lag 
of return on 
invested capital  
0.068 
(1.838) 



























   
Note: For each regression, the regression=s F statistic was not statistically significant. 
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Appendix 1: An Illustrative Model of Unmeasured Skills and Firm Wage Effects 
This section outlines a simple human capital model of wage determination. Although we 
do not expect any such simple model to be literally true, it provides a useful benchmark 
when we move to the data. We have designated several propositions as testable 
assumptions and several as testable implications from the model. While we recognize that 
even the testable assumptions are implications of underlying assumptions, they are 
sufficiently close to each other to treat them as equivalent. 
Assume the true model is completely neoclassical where log(wages), w, are purely a 
reward for general skills (S) with a rate of return B:  
w = B ￿ S. 
Assume further that some employers have higher average returns to skills than do other 
employers. Thus, employers will sort employees, leading employers to differ in their 
average skill levels. If we regress wages against a vector of firm-specific dummies, then 
the estimated coefficients on the dummies will capture the amount of sorting by skills. 
(We will refer to the coefficients on the dummies as the firm wage effects, or as the 
between-firm variation in wages.) Combined with the assumption that wages measure 
skills we have our first testable assumption: 
TA1: Mean wages differ by firm: 
1) w = f1 ￿ firm effects + e1. 
The standard deviation of the coefficients on the firm wage effects (f1) indicate how much 
employers differ in their average skill levels. The standard deviation of the estimated 
residual e1 measures wage and skill variation within each firm.  
Assume we now have an imperfect but fairly accurate measure of skills,  
s = S + u, 
where u is a well-behaved error term uncorrelated with skill or firm. In this case, we can 
decompose the variance of the skill measure into a component due to the variance of 
skills, and a component due to the error: 
V(s) = V(S) + V(u).  
We can now correlate our measure of skills with wages, yielding a testable assumption: 
TA2: The measure of skills is correlated with wages. 
An important debate focuses on why we see employers paying such different wages for 
apparently similar workers and jobs. (Groshen, 1991a, reviews these theories and the   42 
evidence concerning them.) We can address this debate by adding our measure of skills 
to the regression in equation (1), yielding:  
2) w = b2 * s + f2 * firm effects + e2  
Now the standard deviation of the firm wage effects indicate how much employers differ 
in their average skill levels for those skills not measured by s. That is, the imperfect 
measures of skills, s, picks up some of the sorting of skills that was captured by the firm 
effects in equation (1). This yields hypothesis 1:  
H1: The standard deviation of the coefficients on the firm effects (f2) will 
be smaller when controlling for skills in equation (2) than in equation (1) 
with no such controls.  
To the extent that the measure of skills s is highly correlated with wages, we know the 
measurement error on skills (u) must be low. We will now make two further testable 
assumptions: 
Consider the case with data from two time periods, “early” and “late.” Assume similar 
amounts of sorting of both measured (s) and unmeasured (u) skills between employers 
both early and late. We can test for similar sorting of measured skills by noting that if we 
estimate how skills vary between employers,  
s = f3 ￿ firm effects, 
TA3: The estimate of V(f3) should be similar early and late.  
Assume further that the returns to skill (B) has increased over time. Together these imply 
that the variance of firm wage effects with no controls for skills (as in equation (1)) has 
increased proportional to the variance of log(wages).  
H2: Thus, the standard deviation of the coefficients on the firm effects in 
equation (1) should be proportionally larger in the later periods, and the R
2 
should remain constant. 
With constant measurement error of true skills, u, we have  
TA5: The estimated coefficient   from  
3) w = b￿ s + e3 
should have risen over time. The error term in this regression, e3, measures 
the returns on unmeasured skills times the amount of unmeasured skills, u. 
Assume further that the measurement error in our imperfect measure of skills is constant; 
that is, the ratio of true variance V(S) to measured variance V(s) is constant.   43 
(Alternatively, assume that the returns to both the measured and unmeasured components 
of skill both increase equally.) This yields a further testable implication that the higher 
estimated returns to skill explain most of the rise in the variance of log wages. 
Specifically, the estimated R
2 of equation (3) should not have increased over time. The 
standard error of the equation should have increased proportionately with the square root 
of the increase in the estimated returns to skill, b.  
Finally, to the extent that differences in mean wages between employers (firm wage 
effects) are due to differences in mean human capital, controlling for observable skill (s) 
should eliminate most of the increase in the standard deviation of the estimated firm.  
H3: The variance of firm effects in an equation which controls for skill 
should have risen much less over time than the variance of firm effects in 
an equation with no such controls. 
As discussed in the text, all of the testable assumptions (marked “TA” in this appendix) 
hold in this dataset.  
Appendix 2: Correlations of employer effects by level  
  
  






Correlation of employer effect at this level with 




Top executive at employer 
  
0.31 0.39   44 
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Notes: Regressions that estimate 
employer effects include controls for 
function and Hay points. Mean 
employer effect of the other four levels 
are weighted by employment. 
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